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JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE "RIGHT TO DIE":
CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISES UNFULFILLED

Michael P. Allen*

INTRODUCTION

There will be much written about Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and her legacy.
If nothing else, after all, she was the first woman ever to serve on the United States
Supreme Court. But there is far more to Justice O'Connor's place in the American
legal landscape. She was a pivotal swing vote on a highly-divided Court. As such,
her views were often critical to the development of the law over the past two decades.'
And let us not forget that she was one of the five votes that effectively decided the
2000 presidential election.2 There simply is no denying that Justice O'Connor will
be remembered as a major figure in American law whether one praises or despises
her jurisprudence. 3
The popular press has already begun to review and assess the impact Justice
O'Connor made in a number of substantive areas of law. Most frequently mentioned among these areas are affirmative action, abortion, the First Amendment's

* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B.A., 1989, University
of Rochester; J.D., 1992, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleague
Becky Morgan for her comments and her support. Thanks also to the staff of the Stetson Faculty
Support Office for their work on this Essay. Finally, I express my gratitude to the staff of the
William and Mary Bill of Rights Journalfor the work done on this Essay.
' For example, "[olver the past decade... [Justice O'Connor] voted with the majority
in more than three-fourths of court rulings that were decided 5-4." Michael D. Lemonick &
Viveca Novak, The Power Broker, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 31 (citing a study conducted by
Washington law firm Goldstein & Howe).
2 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3 Opinion has been divided in early assessments of Justice O'Connor's time on the
bench. For example, one commentator has asserted that Justice O'Connor "was at the Court
to render her absolutely best judgement case-by-case. And that is what she has done." Marci
Hamilton, The Remarkable Legacy of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,WRIT, July 14, 2005,
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050714.html. Other commentary has been less
favorable. See, e.g., Peter S. Canellos, With a Politician'sEye, O'ConnorLed the Way, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 12, 2005, at A3 ("Her ability to coax her fellow justices into endorsing her
views exceeded her ability to craft the kind of legal doctrines that would ensure that those
views endured after her retirement."). And then there are those who are affirmatively quite
happy to see her retire. See, e.g., Charles Lane, In the Center,Hers Was the Vote that Counted,
WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at Al (quoting a conservative activist as saying: "'We have a
living Constitution. Her name is Sandra Day O'Connor, and thank God she's retiring."').
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Establishment Clause, and federalism. 4 I agree that Justice O'Connor has been an
important voice in these areas- and that her replacement could affect the dialogue
on these significant questions over the years to come. But there are important parts
of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence that are receiving scant attention.
This Essay seeks to fill one significant gap in the developing analysis of Justice
O'Connor's legacy. My focus is on her important contributions concerning the role
the United States Constitution plays in end-of-life decisionmaking.6 All of the Court's
decisions in this area came during Justice O'Connor's tenure.7 In each of them, she
wrote a concurring opinion that took a position different from the majority's reasoning
in important respects. And in each case, O'Connor's concurrence was more protective of federal constitutional rights concerning personal decisions about the time and
manner of one's death.8 The first goal of this Essay is to describe the important role
Justice O'Connor has played in this area of law.
I also explore how the O'Connor legacy in the area of death and dying may
accurately be characterized as one of constitutional promises unfulfilled. In her
important concurring opinions, Justice O'Connor left no doubt that, in her view, the
Constitution most certainly spoke to certain end-of-life matters. For example, she
wrote about the place in constitutional jurisprudence of palliative care and of the
recognition of the right of surrogate decisionmaking. 9 These positions served as
' See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Consistently, a Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005,
at Al; Lane, supra note 3; see also Hamilton, supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Justice O'Connor authored

majority opinion upholding the affirmative action admission program at the University of
Michigan Law School); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(Justice O'Connor co-authored the principal opinion developing the "undue burden" test for
evaluating restrictions on the right to have a pre-viability abortion); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion striking down a
federal statute on the ground that it commandeered a state legislature in contravention of the
Tenth Amendment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (Justice O'Connor wrote
a concurring opinion in an Establishment Clause case in which she articulated an "endorsement test" as a key component of constitutional adjudication in this area).
6 There has been almost no discussion of this aspect of Justice O'Connor's
jurisprudence. For instance, a blog devoted to following the Supreme Court published a sixpart analysis of Justice O'Connor's positions on important legal issues. See Posting of
Anisha Dasgupta to The Supreme Court Nomination Blog, http://www.sctnomination.com/
blog/archives/2005/07/justice-oconnor.htm (July 2, 2005, 17:29 EST). There is no mention
of the right to die cases in this comprehensive discussion. A rare exception was an article in
Time Magazine concerning the issues on which Justice O'Connor has had an impact. Daniel
Eisenberg, What's at Stake in the Fight, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 28-29.

7 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). I discuss each of these
decisions in more detail below. See infra Part I.
8 I discuss Justice O'Connor's positions in greater depth below. See infra Part I.
9 For the former proposition, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), and for the latter, see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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important caveats on the much more laissez-faire attitude of the majority. But these
tantalizing promises of constitutional protections remain unfulfilled as Justice
O'Connor leaves the bench. This is so even though the Court has had occasions
over the years to speak more clearly on these issues. What is more, this failure to
follow through on O'Connor's views has had, and will continue to have, real world
consequences. One can see these consequences in such things as the saga surrounding Terri Schiavo and the case recently decided by the Supreme Court on
January 17, 2006, concerning Oregon's Death with Dignity Act.'0 Thus, with
Justice O'Connor's retirement and the consequent loss of her moderating voice on
these matters, there is a distinct danger that the unfulfilled constitutional promises
may become broken ones.
This Essay is in three parts. Part I discusses the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence in death and dying matters with a particular focus on Justice
O'Connor's views. My aim is not to provide a comprehensive consideration of
these weighty issues. Rather, the more modest goal of this Part is to describe the
constitutional landscape and illustrate how much Justice O'Connor has had to do
with its construction. Part I explores how the promises of greater constitutional
protection for end-of-life rights remain unfulfilled. It also describes the practical
consequences of that state of affairs. Finally, Part III briefly considers the uncertain
future of constitutional protection for the "right to die" in a Court without Justice
O'Connor.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, THE "RIGHT TO DIE," AND JUSTICE O'CONNOR
The Supreme Court has squarely faced issues concerning the constitutional
status of a "right to die" only three times." The first of those cases concerned the
I discuss both of these issues, as well as other examples of the impact of the Court's
equivocal position concerning end-of-life matters, below. See infra Part II.
" One initial difficulty in discussing any end-of-life matter is terminology. See generally
ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DiE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING § 1.01 (3d ed. Supp. 2005) (discussing the difficulties associated with the
term "right to die" and other ways of referring to matters concerning death and dying). The
fundamental problem is that the ways in which we face death and how the "law" affects
those situations are remarkably varied. Indeed, Justice O'Connor alluded to this very idea
when she began one of her important concurring opinions in this area by noting: "Death will
be different for each of us." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus,
the "right to die" can conjure up images of everything from affirmative actions such as
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the one hand to more passive activities such as
the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment on the other. These distinctions may or may
not be real, and they may or may not be outcome determinative in some contexts if they in
fact exist. However, they are not particularly critical for purposes of this Essay. This Essay
is designed to canvas Justice O'Connor's impact on death and dying in a broad way.
Accordingly, I use the term "right to die" to capture the issues in the most comprehensive
way possible.
10

824
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claimed right to refuse medical treatment while the other two dealt with the asserted
right to have a physician assist one in ending life. While these two situations are
really simply variants of the broader "right to die," the Court has treated them as being
entirely distinct." This Essay employs the Court's approach purely for organizational
purposes. In the balance of this Part, I provide a summary of the Court's end-of-life
decisions with a focus on Justice O'Connor's important contributions.
A. Cruzan: The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The first true end-of-life case to reach the Court was its 1990 decision in Cruzan
v. Director,MissouriDepartment of Health.'3 While certainly a landmark decision
in many respects, the issue in Cruzan was actually quite narrow. The State of
Missouri required clear and convincing evidence of a person's intent to refuse
medical treatment in order to support the refusal of such treatment.' " Nancy Cruzan
was in a persistent vegetative state with her body being kept alive by the artificial
provision of nutrition and hydration through a feeding tube.I" Ms. Cruzan's parents
sought permission to remove the feeding tube, claiming that their daughter would
not have wished to be kept alive in her condition.16 A state trial court agreed, but
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed.' 7 The state Supreme Court held that the evidence in the record did not meet the clear and convincing standard required under
Missouri law.'" Ms. Cruzan's parents appealed to the United States Supreme Court
arguing that Missouri's evidentiary requirement violated their daughter's constitutional right to due process of law.'9
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which he rejected
the parents' argument.20 Importantly for present purposes, he only assumed that the
Constitution provided protection for a competent person's right to refuse medical
treatment (including the provision of nutrition and hydration). 2' He also only assumed
See, e.g., Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801-09 (articulating the view that affirmative action, such
as physician assistance, in ending a life are distinct from the omission of medical treatment).
'" 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
14 Id. at 267-69.
'" Id. at 266.
16 Id. at 267-68.
'" Id. at 268.
18 Id. at 268-69.
'9 Id. at 269.
20 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. There are many useful, general discussions of Cruzan.See, e.g.,
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, § 2.03[A]; Michael P. Allen, The Constitutionat the
12

ThresholdofLife and Death:A SuggestedApproach toAccommodate an Interest in Life and
a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 971, 981-83 (2004) [hereinafter Allen, Threshold of Life

and Death]; Symposium, Cruzan and the "Right to Die", 25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991).
21 Cruzan,497 U.S. at 279 ("[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
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that such protection extended to incompetent as well as competent persons.2 After
setting out these assumptions, he ultimately concluded on behalf of the Court that
Missouri's evidentiary policy did not sufficiently undermine the assumed rights
when balanced against the significant state interests implicated. 3
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote for the Chief Justice's opinion.
However, she also wrote a concurring opinion that was far more receptive to end-oflife rights than that of the majority in two important respects.2 4 First, unlike Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor was not equivocal about the constitutionallyprotected status of a right to refuse medical treatment. Far from merely assuming
that the right was protected as a matter of due process, Justice O'Connor explained
in detail why such a right is part of due process.25 She concluded this portion of her
opinion by stating without qualification that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water., 2 6 Needless to say, such an acknowledgment was incredibly significant
coming from a member of the majority. But it did not have the force of law. At this
point, Justice O'Connor's concurrence was a tantalizing vision of what could be; to
many it no doubt had the nature of a constitutional promise that would - or at least
might -

come to be.27

23

Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 280-87.

24

Other commentators have made reference to the importance of Justice O'Connor's

22

Cruzan concurrence. See, e.g., George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed in the
PoliticalBattle Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REv. 49, 52-53 n. 14 (2005); Linda R.
Hirshman, The Philosophyof PersonalIdentity and the Life and Death Cases,68 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 91, 91-92 (1992); Robert L. Kline, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: Assisted
Suicide as a FundamentalLiberty Interest, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 527, 546-48 (1997). A

recently published biography of Justice O'Connor also recognizes the importance of her
views in Cruzan and the other end of life cases. See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR 214-15 (2005). The biography posits that Justice O'Connor' s positions may have

been motivated in part by her successful fight against breast cancer. Id.
25 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To be sure, Justice O'Connor
did not provide many details about the right she posited. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Cruzan
and the ConstitutionalStatus of NontreatmentDecisionsfor IncompetentPatients,25 GA. L.

REv. 1139, 1173 (1991) (discussing the significant issues left open in Justice O'Connor's
Cruzanposition). But the lack of details should not detract from the import of the concurrence.
26

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

One might argue that O'Connor's statement should be regarded as the essential holding
of Cruzan because it can be combined with the votes of the four dissenting Justices to support
the constitutionally protected status of the right at issue. See, e.g., id. at 302 (Brennan,
dissenting);
J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 330-31 (Stevens, J.,
27

see also MEISEL&CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 2-11 (making a similar argument regarding

Justice O'Connor's position concerning recognition of the wishes of an incompetent person's
surrogate decisionmaker). Such an approach is not the best reading of Cruzan. It would seem
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Second, Justice O'Connor went beyond the majority in dealing with the exercise
of the right to refuse medical treatment by incompetent persons. In particular, while
acknowledging that the Court did not need to address the question, she stated that
the duty to "give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker ...may well
be constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment., 28 Once again, such a right could be quite significant as a constraint on
governmental action. It would suggest, for example, that a state would need to accord
deference to a living will or other advance directive. And, perhaps, that a state would
need to allow oral evidence concerning an incompetent person's desires. I do not
mean to explore these issues here. Rather, I merely suggest that Justice O'Connor's
views are significant and would be more so if adopted by the Court. In any event, we
have another "constitutional promise" from Justice O'Connor. 9 These promises were
to continue when the Court next faced a right to die case.
B. Glucksberg and Vacco: The Right to Physician-AssistedSuicide

Seven years after deciding Cruzan, the Court faced a pair of cases raising a very

31
3°
different right to die issue. In both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill,

the Court confronted different aspects of the same question: whether the Constitution provides any right to a physician's assistance in ending one's life.32 The Court
held in both cases that there was no right to have the assistance of a physician in
such an endeavor.33
odd in the extreme if a position rejected by an opinion with five votes could be said to be the
holding of a case. Moreover, as I describe below, the reading is belied as a practical matter by
the confusion in the lower courts over Cruzan'simport. See infra Part II.
28 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29 Although this Essay is not meant to be an evaluation of Justice O'Connor's broader
jurisprudence, it is interesting to note that her use of a concurrence in Cruzan fits comfortably
into her broader judging "style." For example, several political scientists have written about
Justice O'Connor's use of concurrences as a means to narrow the sweep of majority opinions
even when she joins them. See NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR:
STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 52-69 (1996); ROBERT W. VAN SICKLE, NOT A
PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 49-62
(1998); see also BISKUPIC, supranote 24, at 173-74 (noting Justice O'Connor's use of con-

curring opinions to shape the development of law). In short, Cruzan is an excellent example
of the more general means by which Justice O'Connor approached judging on the Court.
30 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
31, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
32 Glucksberg raised the

issue as a matter of substantive due process. See Glucksberg,

521 U.S. at 705-06. Vacco involved an equal protection challenge based on a claimed

difference in treatment between those desiring to refuse or withdraw medical treatment and
those wishing to have a doctor's assistance in bringing about death in another manner. See
Vacco, 521 U.S. at 796-97.
31See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09. As with Cruzan, there

2006]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE "RIGHT TO DIE"

As with Cruzan, Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote for the majority
opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist in both Glucksberg and Vacco.34 Also as in
Cruzan, however, she concurred in both cases.35 And, again as with Cruzan, her
concurring views differed from those of the majority in a critical respect. In these
cases, the critical difference concerned the breadth of the issue being decided. The
Chief Justice's opinions essentially sought to close the door on arguments concerning any fundamental right associated with affirmative physician assistance at the
end-of-life.36 Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, took a more incremental approach
in the area even as she gave the Chief Justice his critical fifth vote.
Justice O'Connor made clear that her agreement with the majority was premised
on her conclusion that the Constitution did not protect a "generalized right to 'commit
suicide.' "3 As to that issue the constitutional debate had ended. However, she also
mentioned a "narrower" issue about which she reserved judgment, namely "whether
a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent
death. 3 8 As to that question, at least, the issue was still open.
There is disagreement in the academic literature concerning the scope and true import of Justice O'Connor's position. 3 Whatever the merits of the differing positions

are a number of excellent commentaries on these cases. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 11, § 12.05[A]; Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After
Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REv. 885 (1998).
" Both Glucksberg and Vacco were unanimous in their results. However, Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer declined to join the majority opinion in either case.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 704; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 794.
" Justice O'Connor concurred in both Vacco and Glucksberg in a single opinion. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 n.t (O'Connor, J., concurring in a single opinion).
36 See, e.g., id. at 728 (majority opinion).
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all
efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to
conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide
is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.
Id.
37 Id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 Id. Justice O'Connor did not feel compelled to address this issue because the record
in the cases before her indicated that no person would be denied pain medication even if the
provision of such drugs would hasten death. Id. at 736-37.
39 Some commentators argue that Justice O'Connor's position is exceedingly narrow,
thus decreasing the significance of her concurrence. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E.
Coleson, Three Strikes: Is an Assisted Suicide Right Out?, 15 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 54-61
(1999); Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning andImpact of the Physician-AssistedSuicide Cases,
82 MINN. L. REv. 895, 904-10 (1998); Michael M. McConnell, The Right to Die and the
Jurisprudenceof Tradition,1997 UTAHL. REv. 665,678-80; Gina Patterson, Comment, The
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in this debate, there is no question that her position is significant in context because
it leaves questions to be resolved in later cases. In other words, the door remained
open even if one did not know precisely how far.
At the most basic level, Justice O'Connor's opinion can be cited for the proposition that there may be a constitutional due process right to palliative care (i.e., pain
management) at the end of life. That may be a narrow issue, but it is an important
one.40 Moreover, when one combines Justice O'Connor's views in Glucksberg and
Vacco with her statements in Cruzan concerning surrogate decisionmaking, the constitutional possibilities expand. In Glucksberg, pain management leading even to
death might be a constitutionally protected right. In Cruzan, one reads that Justice
O'Connor believes that the Constitution may also protect the right to surrogate
decisionmaking. 4" Thus, the combination of the two principles suggests that the
right to physician assistance in pain management could extend to the incompetent
person as well, at least to an incompetent person who could be experiencing pain.
Again, I am not trying to craft an argument for this assertion, but the seeds for such
a position are present in Justice O'Connor's writings.
In the final analysis, whatever the scope of the exception contemplated by
Justice O'Connor in Glucksberg and Vacco, it was certainly noteworthy when compared to the far more absolute positions of the Chief Justice. Colloquially speaking,
Justice O'Connor allowed the Constitution to live to fight another day in this area.
It was yet another constitutional promise concerning the right to die.42
Supreme Court Passes the Torch on PhysicianAssisted Suicide: Washington v. Glucksberg

and Vacco v. Quill, 35 HOus. L. REv. 851, 869-70 (1998). Others have asserted that the
O'Connor position is potentially quite significant as a restriction on the scope of the majority's
holding. See, e.g., Robert Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a
Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997); Steven G.
Calabresi, The Libertarian-LiteConstitutionalOrderand the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J.
1023, 1044 (2005); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,23

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 616-17 (2000); David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and
Physician-AssistedSuicide: RejectingAssisted Suicide but EmbracingEuthanasia,337 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1236 (1997).

4 I discuss its importance in greater detail below in connection with cases in which a

right to palliative care has not been discussed, thus leaving the constitutional promise
unfulfilled. See infra Part II.
4' See supra Part L.A (discussing Cruzan).
42 Justice O'Connor's physician-assisted suicide position is also consistent with her
broader approach to deciding cases. While described in varying ways, that approach is one
that focuses on the facts of given disputes so as to decide issues on narrow grounds. The result is that questions are left unresolved so that they may be answered in later cases. See, e.g.,
MAVEETY, supra note 29, at 29-30 (describing Justice O'Connor's case-by-case approach as
"pragmatic centrism"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT ATIME: JUDICIAL MINIMAISM ON
THE SUPREME CoURT 75-116 (1999) (discussing the benefits of"minimalist" decisionmaking
in the context of the "right to die"); VAN SICKLE, supranote 29, at 45-54 (generally discussing
what the author terms Justice O'Connor's "marginalist" approach to decisionmaking); Steven
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C. A Summary: Justice O'Connor,Her Promises,and Their Context

As described above, Justice O'Connor has played a central role in the development of the Court's limited jurisprudence concerning the right to die. She has been
the fifth vote for the majority opinion in each case in this area, yet she in some
respects limited those opinions by expressing more nuanced views in her concurrences. Those concurrences were important for the promises they made, but they
were not the "law." The next Part explores how those promises have remained
unfulfilled. It also explains why the unfulfilled nature of Justice O'Connor's end-oflife promises is important.
Before moving on, however, a final comment concerning Justice O'Connor's
contributions in this area is in order. It would be easy to read Justice O'Connor's
opinions in both Cruzan and the assisted suicide cases as being heavily influenced by
' That is certainly
a desire to allow experimentation in the "laboratory of the states."43
4
true to some extent. But focusing only on a desire for state experimentation is
highly misleading. Justice O'Connor's approach to end-of-life issues generally is
far more discriminating than that advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example.
At the conclusion of his opinion for the Court in Glucksberg, he also advanced state
experimentation rhetoric. 45 But the Chief Justice's exultation of experimentation
came after he effectively foreclosed meaningful constitutional review in the area at
hand.' Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, provides for state experimentation
only after ensuring that there is a sufficient constitutional floor in place to protect
I. Friedland, The Centralityof Fact to the JudicialPerspective:Fact Use in Constitutional
Cases, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 91, 125-27 (2002) (noting that in both Cruzan and Glucksberg,
Justice O'Connor took a more fact-based approach than did the majority, thus leaving more
issues unresolved). Interestingly, one commentator writing after Justice O'Connor announced
her retirement has suggested that this case-by-case approach will result in Justice O'Connor's
legacy being "limited and ephemeral." Kermit Roosevelt, The Centrist Cannot Hold, AM.
PROsPEcT ONLINE, July 5,2005, http://www.prospect.org/web/printftiendly-view.ww?id=9933.

Whatever the effect on her legacy, one can certainly see the incremental nature of Justice
O'Connor's decisionmaking in the context of the Court's right to die cases.
The laboratory metaphor is attributed most frequently to Justice Brandeis. See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
13

cited Brandeis in her Cruzan concurrence. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (discussing state experimentation in the context of physician-assisted suicide);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing state experimentation in the

context of procedures utilized for making decisions concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment).
" See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 ("Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an

earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.").
" See supra Part I.B (discussing the majority opinion in Glucksberg).
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individual rights. That difference in approach is a critical one when individual
liberty is at issue.47
In this Part, I have explained the important legacy that Justice O'Connor leaves
concerning the United States Constitution and the right to die. That legacy may not
be as visible as her impact on other controversial topics such as abortion and
affirmative action, but it should not be undervalued. In the next Part, I explain how
Justice O'Connor's constitutional promises remain unfulfilled and why it matters
that that is the case.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISES REMAIN UNFULFILLED

The Supreme Court has not rendered another decision addressing end-of-life
matters since Glucksberg and Vacco in 1997. During that time, Justice O'Connor's
tantalizing constitutional promises lay fallow. In this Part, I first explain why that
need not have been the case. Thereafter, I explore the implications of these constitutional promises remaining unfulfilled.
A. Justice O'Connor'sConstitutionalPromisesNeed Not Have Gone Unfulfilled
The Court's trilogy of right to die cases should have been only the beginning of
its exploration of the Constitution's role in death and dying in America. Much has
been made of Justice O'Connor's incremental approach to deciding cases.48 An
advantage of her "one step at a time" jurisprudence is that it allows the Court to deal
with new issues of constitutional law in a deliberative fashion. There is no need to
take absolute positions because the Court will return to the area to explore discrete
issue after discrete issue. Eventually a body of law will develop as a result of the
incrementalist approach. 49 The key to such an approach, however, is that the Court.
must return to the area in question. If it does not, one is left with only a narrow area
of defined law surrounded by a vast expanse of uncertainty. Unfortunately, that is
the situation concerning the right to die.
One can see this issue most clearly with respect to Justice O'Connor's
suggestion in Glucksberg that the Constitution might protect a right to palliative care
or pain management. ° The Court has not decided a case that expressly raised this
" In fact, one commentator has suggested that Justice O'Connor's opinions in Cruzan
and Glucksberg reflect a fundamental distrust of state legislatures rather than more general
praise for state legislative experimentation. Larry I. Palmer, InstitutionalAnalysis and
Physicians' Rights After Vacco v. Quill, 7 CoRNELL J.L & PUB. POL'Y 415,424-25 (1998).
48 See, e.g., supra note 42 (collecting sources concerning the incremental jurisprudential
approach of Justice O'Connor).
49 For a general discussion and defense of "judicial minimalism" in the "right to die"
context, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 42, at 75-116.
50

See supra Part I.B (discussing Glucksberg and physician-assisted suicides).
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issue. Nevertheless, there have been three occasions on which at a minimum Justice
O'Connor could have expanded on her constitutional promises. And, who knows,
if she had done so she might have convinced enough of her fellow Justices to join
her so that the promise would have become the law. I discuss two of these missed
opportunities in this Part. I return to the third one near the end of the Essay.51
The first missed opportunity came in 2001 in connection with United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.52 At issue in Oakland Cannabis was
whether there was a medical necessity defense to the prohibitions on the manufac53
ture and distribution of marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
California had enacted a law designed to shield from state prosecution the distribution of marijuana to those persons who had a doctor's prescription and who needed
marijuana for medicinal purposes.' Several cooperatives began to distribute the
drug given the protections the California law afforded. In response to the actions
of these cooperatives, federal authorities sought certain civil remedies under the
Controlled Substances Act designed to stop the cooperatives from distributing marijuana.56 The cooperatives sought to raise medical necessity as a defense to that civil
enforcement action. The Court held that there was no such defense under the federal
statute.58 It reasoned as a matter of statutory construction that Congress had not
enacted the defense and, therefore, a federal court had no discretion to craft a medical
necessity exception to the explicit statutory provisions.59
The decision in Oakland Cannabis was unanimous, but the majority opinion
garnered only five votes. 6° Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion; she did
not write separately to explain whether her views differed in any respect from those
of the majority. It is here that she missed an opportunity to expand on her views
from Glucksberg. The cooperatives expressly argued that there were people for
whom marijuana was required to ease pain. 6 ' They were supported in this argument

"1 See infra Part II.B.3.
52
13

532 U.S. 483 (2001).
Id. at 486.

54id.
55 id.
56 Id. at 486-87.
57 Id.

Id. at 486.
9 See id. at 489-95.
6 Id. at 485. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg con58

curred in the judgment. Justice Breyer did not participate. Id.
61 See Brief for the Respondents at *42-45, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-151), 2001 WL 173541.
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by several amici. 62 These arguments presented a perfect opportunity for Justice
O'Connor to further develop her constitutional promise concerning a right to
palliative care. She would not necessarily have had to accept the proposition that
marijuana in fact had medicinal uses. Instead, she could have explained that if there
was a proper evidentiary showing that such was the case, and a patient was able to
demonstrate that she would not otherwise be able to avoid pain, there might be
constitutional implications regarding the refusal to recognize a medical necessity
defense. She did not take this opportunity, however, and the constitutional promise
from Glucksberg remained unfulfilled and unexplored.
Justice O'Connor had another opportunity to develop her theory from
Glucksberg, this time during what proved to be her final full term on the Court. In
2005, the Supreme Court decided the highly anticipated case of Gonzales v. Raich.63
Raich also concerned the federal Controlled Substances Act. 64 In this instance, the
principal issue the Court faced was whether Congress exceeded its powers under the
Constitution's Commerce Clause 65 when it criminalized "the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law." 66 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ruled that Congress did not have the
authority under the Commerce Clause to take such an action.67
In a decision that will likely be debated for some time, the Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court. It held that Congress possessed the power under the
Commerce Clause to criminalize the manufacture or distribution of marijuana even
under such highly localized conditions. 68 This Essay is not the place to explore the
import of this decision on Commerce Clause doctrine. What is interesting for present
purposes is that Justice O'Connor wrote the principal dissent in the case. 69 Her dissent
was a forceful reiteration of the principles of federalism the Court had espoused in
earlier cases.7" Entirely missing from the opinion, however, was any mention whatsoever of a due process limitation on the restriction imposed by the Controlled Substances Act on patients' access to pain relief. Moreover, as with Oakland Cannabis,
See, e.g., Brief of Edward Neil Brundridge et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-151); Brief Amici
Curiae of the Am. Pub. Health Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents, Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-151).
63 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
64 id.
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power .. . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes....").
6 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2204-05.
67 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
68 See id. at 2204-15.
69 Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70 See, e.g., id. at 2221-22 (discussing United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000),
and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
62
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Justice O'Connor had before her explicit arguments concerning this important
issue." Consequently, Justice O'Connor missed another opportunity to explore and
refine the issue she raised in Glucksberg and Vacco.72
One cannot be quite as critical of Justice O'Connor in connection with her
Cruzan promises. Nonetheless, there is also a sense here of missed opportunity. On
several occasions, the Court has had to consider whether to grant a writ of certiorari
with respect to an end-of-life case raising issues similar to those in Cruzan. For
example, in 1995 it was faced with a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court
holding that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Michael Martin would
have wished to decline life-sustaining medical treatment.7 3 The Court declined to
take up the case.74 Thereafter, in 1997 it refused to review a case in which the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin had determined that a seventy-one-year-old woman suffering
from Alzheimer' s disease had not sufficiently made clear her intentions concerning
medical treatment before becoming incompetent.75 Further, at several points in the
The argument was asserted by the Respondents in the Supreme Court. See Brief for
Respondents, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454). It was also raised by amici in
support of the Respondents. See, e.g., Brief of the Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454);
Brief of Lymphoma Found. of Am. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454); Brief of the Leukemia & Lymphoma Soc'y et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454). Indeed,
even the majority opinion raised the point. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (majority opinion)
(noting the request of the parties to reach the issue of medical necessity, but declining to do so
because the Ninth Circuit had not yet ruled on the question).
72 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to consider other arguments asserted
by the parties, including certain constitutional issues. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215. As of the
completion of this Essay, no further proceedings have taken place.
73 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995). As with many cases in this area, the facts
in Martinare tragic. Mr. Martin was in an automobile accident in which he suffered a serious
head injury leaving him "'significantly impaired in his physical and cognitive abilities."' Id.
at 402 (quoting In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)). Mr. Martin's
wife sought an order withdrawing her husband's feeding tube. Id. Michael Martin's mother
and sister opposed that request. Id. After a series of hearings and 'appeals, the trial ctourt
found, and the intermediate Michigan appellate court affirmed, that there was clear and
convincing evidence that Michael Martin would not have wished to receive medical
treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration in his medical condition. Id. at 403-05.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed this determination. Id. at 413. It concluded that the
lower courts were incorrect to have determined that the appropriate evidentiary showing had
been made. Id.
'4 See 516 U.S. 1113 (1996) (denying certiorari).
7 In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., Spahn v.
Wittman, 522 U.S. 951 (1997). This case concerned Edna M.F., a seventy-one-year-old
woman with severe dementia from Alzheimer's Disease being fed through a feeding tube.
Id. at 487. She was bedridden but not in a persistent vegetative state. Id. Her sister and
guardian requested that the hospital allow her to direct the withdrawal of the feeding tube
7'
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Terri Schiavo saga, the Court declined to enter the fray.76 I am not suggesting that
the lower court in any of these cases was necessarily incorrect. However, the Court
missed an opportunity to further refine its jurisprudence in this area along the lines
Justice O'Connor suggested in Cruzan, which could have been done even if the
Court affirmed these lower court decisions.
In sum, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity time and again over the past
fifteen years to further address the role of the United States Constitution in death and
dying. These opportunities could have been occasions used to expand on and clarify
the constitutional promises Justice O'Connor had made. Those opportunities were
missed, and, as I describe next, significant negative consequences have resulted.
B. The PracticalImpact of the Unfulfilled Promises
One might be forgiven for thinking that it is all very interesting as an academic
matter that Justice O'Connor made promises concerning the right to die that have
not come to pass but that there is no real world impact arising from the situation.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Instead, there are quite dramatic consequences flowing from Justice O'Connor's unfulfilled constitutional promises. Indeed, it is by no
means melodramatic to say that this state of affairs has had a life and death impact
in the "real world." In this Part, I highlight only a few such situations, some of which
are widely known and others of which took place largely out of the public eye.
1. The Sad Case of Sheila Pouliot

77

In 1999, Sheila Pouliot was in her early forties.7 ' As a result of contracting certain
diseases as an infant, she had never been competent. 79 For her entire life, she required
care from others in order to live. 80 A member of her family had always served as her
legal guardian.8 ' As of 1999, Ms. Pouliot was chronically ill and in exceedingly poor

based on Edna's previously articulated preferences. Id. The hospital agreed, but only if all of
Edna's family concurred. Id. One of Edna's nieces refused to agree, and the hospital refused
to act. Id. The sister/guardian thereafter sought judicial permission to remove Edna's feeding
tube. Id. The trial court denied the petition finding insufficient evidence of Edna's intent. Id.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed that decision. Id. at 491-92.
76 See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005) (denying motion
for stay of enforcement ofjudgment pending petition for writ of certiorari); Bush v. Schiavo,
543 U.S. 1121 (2005) (denying certiorari). I discuss Terri Schiavo's end-of-life drama below.
See infra Part II.B.2.
17 I have discussed Ms. Pouliot's case elsewhere as well. See Allen, Threshold ofLife and
Death, supra note 20, at 984-86.
78 Blouin v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 2004).
79

Id.

80 Id.
8"

See id. at 353.
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health. 2 Among other things, she had lost the ability to eat and drink and was being
fed and hydrated through a feeding tube. 3 By December of that year, she "was
acutely ill and, by all accounts, near death" when she was admitted to a hospital in
Syracuse, New York. 4
Ms. Pouliot' s family, including her then-guardian Alice Blouin, consulted with
the hospital medical staff, its medical ethics committee, and members of the clergy
concerning what treatment to provide Ms. Pouliot.8 ' The ultimate conclusion
reached by this group was that Ms Pouliot would be provided with comfort care,
such as the administration of morphine for pain, but that "neither artificial nutrition
and hydration nor antibiotics would be administered. ' 6
But Ms. Pouliot would not be allowed to pass away peacefully. The New York
State Attorney General's Office put pressure on the hospital to reverse its decision.8
As a result of this pressure, the hospital provided aggressive care to Ms. Pouliot
even though such care was against the advice of her doctors, contrary to the wishes
of her family, and caused Ms. Pouliot pain. 8 Eventually, Ms. Pouliot's family was
able to obtain a court order allowing the hospital to follow the originally agreedupon treatment plan.89 She passed away shortly thereafter,' but her passing did not
diminish the pain she had been forced to suffer beforehand.
After Ms. Pouliot's death, her guardian brought suit against the New York State
Attorney General claiming that his actions violated Ms. Pouliot's federal constitutional rights. 9' The circuit court affirmed the dismissal of this lawsuit.92 Significantly, it did so because the right to surrogate decisionmaking concerning end-oflife matters was not established clearly enough to support liability. 93 Thus, we see
Id. at 352.
id.
84 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described Ms. Pouliot' s
condition in the following terms: "She was experiencing low oxygen levels and a high fever.
She was suffering from hypotension, aspiration pneumonia, internal bleeding, severe
abdominal pain, and a non-functioning intestine." Id.
82
83

85

Id.

86

87

Id.
Id. at 353-54.

88

See id. at 353-55. This point is driven home vividly by the treatment notes of one of

Ms. Pouliot's doctors: "From an ethical standpoint, I believe this continued treatment,
however well intentioned, is now inhumane and is causing suffering. From a medical

standpoint, it is outside of the bounds of what I consider to be medically indicated care." Id.
at 355 n.4.
89 Id. at 355.
90 Id. at 356.
9'Id. The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Id.
92 Id. at 365.
9'Id. at 359. This conclusion was critical because, under § 1983, state actors have qualified immunity "unless the official 'violated clearly established rights of which an objectively
reasonable official would have known."' Id. at 358 (quoting Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139,
143 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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in the tragic story of Shelia Pouliot the real world impact of the Court's failure to
develop the constitutional promises Justice O'Connor had made. Not only would
Justice O'Connor's arguments concerning surrogate decisionmaking from Cruzan
have helped Ms. Pouliot, so would the O'Connor suggestion of a right to pain management at the end of life. Ms. Pouliot was denied her surrogate decisionmaker and, most
cruelly, affirmatively made to endure pain. These things did not have to come to pass.
2. The Saga Concerning Terri Schiavo
It seemed as if the entire world was watching earlier this year as Terri Schiavo' s
family fought over her end-of-life wishes. Theresa Marie Schiavo was twenty-seven
years old in 1990 when she lost consciousness, causing her brain to be deprived of
oxygen for several minutes. 94 She was eventually diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state.95 After Ms. Schiavo had remained in this state for nearly eight
years, Michael Schiavo, Terri's husband and guardian, sought judicial permission
to remove the feeding tube keeping his wife's body alive. 96 Ms. Schiavo's parents
opposed these efforts, leading to years of quite intense litigation. 97 At every step of
the way, courts determined that Ms. Schiavo would not have wanted to continue to
receive nutrition and hydration in her current condition.98 But Ms. Schiavo' s parents
could not accept this fact and fought to keep their daughter "alive." In addition to
using, and perhaps even abusing,' the court system, her parents were able to convince both the Florida Legislature1°° and the United States Congress' ° ' to intercede
9'See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). At
the time of this decision, everyone involved worked under the assumption that Ms. Schiavo
"suffered a cardiac arrest as a result of a potassium imbalance." Id. An autopsy indicated
that, in fact, Ms. Schiavo had not suffered a cardiac arrest. See JON R. THOGMARTIN, DIST.
SIXMEDICALEXAMINER'S OFFICE, REPORT OFAUTOPSY: THERESA SCHIAvO (June 13, 2005),

availableat http://www.abstractappeal.com/schiavo/autopsy report.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2006). The precise cause of Ms. Schiavo's 1990 collapse remains unknown.
9'See In re Guardianship of Scliavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
96

Id.

" See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3574, at *1 n.1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (listing numerous reported decisions concerning Terri Schiavo
in both state and federal courts over a period of nearly five years).
98 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship
of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
99I have explained in detail elsewhere how the litigation concerning Ms. Schiavo
amounted to an abuse of the civil justice system. See generallyMichael P. Allen, Life, Death,
and Advocacy: Rules of Procedurein the ContestedEnd-of-Life Case, 34 STETSON L. REv.
55, 68-80 (2004) [hereinafter Allen, Life, Death, and Advocacy].
'o See 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418 (2003).
10 See Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15-16
(2005) ("[T]he District Court shall issue such declaratory and injunctive relief as may be
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in the case. Only after much wrangling was Terri Schiavo's body allowed to die on
March 31, 2005, after her wishes were finally carried out.102
There is an incredible amount that could, and probably will, be written about
Ms. Schiavo's life and death, but this is not the place for such endeavors.' 0 3 Rather,
I want to draw attention to a thread that seemed to run throughout the drama surrounding Ms. Schiavo. At various points in the struggle to effectuate her end-of-life
wishes, a range of governmental entities took actions designed to impede the removal of her feeding tube even after it had been determined in judicial proceedings
that such removal was her desire. It seems to me quite unlikely that these actions
would have been taken, or at least taken in the manner they were, if the right to surrogate decisionmaking in death and dying was more explicit. Two examples are
sufficient to make the point.
First, by October 2003, Ms. Schiavo's parents had exhausted all their avenues
of appeal and their daughter's feeding tube had been removed pursuant to the order
of a Florida court.' 4 At that point, a tremendous amount of political pressure was
placed on the Florida Legislature and Florida Governor Jeb Bush to "save Terri
Schiavo.' ', 0 5 Following this pressure, the Florida legislature enacted what popularly
became known as Terri's Law.' °6 Terri's Law essentially applied only to Ms. Schiavo
and allowed the governor to unilaterally issue a one-time "stay" of any order to remove
a feeding tube from someone in Ms. Schiavo's condition. 7 Pursuant to the Act,
Governor Bush directed that Ms. Schiavo be physically removed from her hospice
and have a feeding tube surgically reinserted. 10 8 Terri's Law was ultimately declared unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution, but only after Ms. Schiavo' s
wishes concerning the control of her body had been thwarted, at least in the short
necessary to protect the rights of Theresa Marie Schiavo... relating to the withholding or
withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life.").
102 See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Long LegalBattle Over as Schiavo Dies, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 2005, at Al (reporting on Ms. Schiavo's death).
103 I have already written elsewhere about various aspects of the Schiavo saga. See
Michael P. Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primeron the American Constitutional
Order?, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 309 (2006) (discussing federal intervention in Ms. Schiavo's
situation) [hereinafter Allen, Primer];Allen, Life, Death, and Advocacy, supra note 99, at
68-90 (discussing procedural history of state court litigation involving Terri Schiavo);
Michael P. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, 35 STETSON L. REv. 179 (2005) (discussing
Florida legislative intervention in the Schiavo case).
'04 See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
105 See Allen, ThresholdofLife and Death,supranote 20, at 1009-12 (discussing political
pressures on legislators in October 2003).
"o See 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418 (2003).
107

Id.

'o' See Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21,2003), availableathttp://sun6.dms.state.fl.
us/eog-new/eog/orders/2003/october/eo2003-201-10-22-03.html; William R. Levesque et
al., Gov. Bush's Order PutsSchiavo Back on Fluids,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003,
at Al.
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run.' 9 One hopes that Florida's legislature and the governor of the state would not
have taken such a clumsy step to deprive a citizen of a firmly established federal
right. 110
A less clumsy illustration of an attempt to thwart Ms. Schiavo's rights came in
March 2005 after a Florida court had yet again ordered the removal of Ms. Schiavo' s
feeding tube. This time, it was the United States Congress that intervened when it
passed Public Law 109-3, "An Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo."'
This Act conferred federal court jurisdiction over a claim by Ms.
Schiavo's parents that their daughter's federal constitutional or statutory rights had
been violated in connection with the Florida state court proceedings. 1 2 As with
Florida's Terri's Law, the federal statute was largely the result of politics. Ms.
Schiavo' s parents filed a claim under the statute, but it was rejected, and their daughter
was allowed to pass away.' 3 However, once again, it would seem logical to suppose
that Congress would not have acted as it did if there had been clearer constitutional
protections of the right to make end-of-life decisions.
3. The Imposition of Morals by Fiat
In 1994, the citizens of Oregon approved a referendum to legalize physicianassisted suicide." 4 Pursuant to that referendum, the Oregon legislature passed the
Death with Dignity Act.' The statute was narrowly drawn to allow a small subset
of Oregonians to have the assistance of a doctor in ending their lives.'1 6 If one
stopped the story at this point it would seem that experimentation in the states was
working; Oregon could go its way on a contentious issue while other states went in
a different direction." 7 But the story does not end here.
"o See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). For a comprehensive consideration
of Terri's Law and the decision in Bush v. Schiavo, see Symposium, Reflections on and
Implications of Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REv. 1 (2005).
"' But this faith in Florida's elected officials may be misplaced. The right of an
incompetent person to refuse medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, is clearly
protected under the Constitution of the State of Florida. See In re Guardianship of Browning,
568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990).
"'. Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
112 Id. § 2. I have extensively discussed this statute elsewhere. See Allen, Primer,supra
note 103.
"' See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to amended complaint);
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of
preliminary injunctive relief with respect to original complaint).
14 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 12-82.
"' OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West 2003).
116 See, e.g., id. § 127.860 (limiting the Death with Dignity Act to Oregon
residents).
117See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 12-82 (discussing failed attempts
to approve referenda allowing physician-assisted suicide in Washington and California).
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In 2001, then-United States Attorney General John Ashcroft issued what has
come to be known as the "Ashcroft Directive."" 8 The Ashcroft Directive asserted
that physician-assisted suicide served no "'legitimate medical purpose"' under the
federal Controlled Substances Act." 9 As such, engaging in conduct allowed under
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act could subject doctors, pharmacists and others
to the revocation of their licenses.1 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court injunction against the Directive.' 2' The circuit
court ruled that the Attorney General had exceeded his authority with respect to the
Controlled Substances Act.' 22 The court did not reach any issues concerning individual end-of-life rights other than to refer to the Supreme Court's dicta that these
matters should be left to the states.123 The United States Supreme Court accepted the
government's appeal. 24 The Court heard argument in the case on October 5, 2005.l,5
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment. 126 With Justice
O'Connor in the majority, the Court held that Attorney General Ashcroft had acted
far beyond his authority when he promulgated the regulation at issue. 127The Court's

Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9,
2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
118

"9 See id. at 56,608.
120 id.
121 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
123

Id. at 1125-30.
See id. at 1123.

124

Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005) (granting certiorari).

122

See Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar for the Session Beginning
October 3, 2005, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumentcalendars/monthlyargumentcaloctober2005.pdf. Argument in Gonzales v. Oregon was lively.
125

See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S. Authority Over States on AssistedSuicide, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at Al (describing oral arguments in Gonzales). However, none of the
justices, including Justice O'Connor, focused on the end of life issues implicated in the case.
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2005) (No.
04-623), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/
04-623.pdf.
126 See Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
127 See id. at 925. The strength of the Court's rejection of the Government's arguments in
the case is apparent in the final paragraph of the majority opinion:

The Government, in the end, maintains that the prescription
requirement delegates to a single Executive officer the power to effect
a radical shift of authority from the States to the Federal Government
to define general standards of medical practice in every locality. The
text and structure of the [Controlled Substances Act] show that
Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state
balance and the congressional role maintaining it.
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opinion is devoted almost entirely to fundamental concepts of administrative law. 128
It does not deal with the underlying death and dying related matters other than to
129
note that the Court has left debate on the issue to state-based debate.
Significantly for present purposes, Justice O'Connor elected not to write
separately. Thus, in what was one of her final decisions as a member of the Court
she failed once again to take steps that would have advanced the positions she
outlined earlier. The promises remained unfulfilled.
In sum, then, the Ashcroft Directive was an unabashed attempt to impose a certain
moral position on the citizens of Oregon, and everywhere else for that matter. 3 0 It did
not matter that the people of that state had determined to allow greater freedom than
the Court had previously found protected by the Constitution. The simple fact of the
matter was that Attorney General Ashcroft believed that physician-assisted suicide
was morally wrong, and he used his power to impose that view on every man, woman,
and child in the United States. Such morality by fiat would not be possible, or at
least it would be a great deal more difficult to impose, if Justice O'Connor's constitutional promises had been fulfilled. In the end, the failure of the Court, and perhaps
Justice O'Connor in particular, to secure the right of dying citizens is lamentable,
even if the decision to reject the imposition of morality by fiat is a welcome one.
I1. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
This Essay has discussed the central role Justice O'Connor played in the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the "right to die" with a special
emphasis on her unfulfilled promises in the area. Her ability to fulfill those promises
has now passed. Instead, this ability now rests with her replacement.'13 Accordingly,
In particular, the Court held that the Attorney General's action did not warrant
deference as an agency interpretation of its own rules or of an ambiguous statutory provision.
Id. at 915-22.
129 See, e.g., id. at 911,921.
131 Portions of the Court's opinion appear to recognize this fact. For example, in rejecting
the Government's position the Court noted that to accept the Government's logic would give
"extraordinary power" to the Attorney General. Id. at 918. Continuing, the Court said "If the
Attorney's General's argument were correct, his power to deregister necessarily would
include the greater power to criminalize even the actions of registered physicians, whenever
they engage in conduct he deems illegitimate." Id.
3' The President nominated Circuit Judge Samuel Alito to replace Justice O'Connor. See
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Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court, CNN.com, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/

2005/POLITICS/10/3 1/scotus.bush/index.html [hereinafter Bush Nominates Alito]. He was
confirmed by the Senate on January 31, 2006. Alito Sworn in as Nation's 11Oth Supreme
Court Justice, CNN.com, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/3 l/alito/
index.html. Justice Alito has apparently not faced an end-of-life case in his time on the
bench. Thus, while he is said to be conservative, see Bush NominatesAlito, supra,one would
be engaging largely in speculation in terms of assessing how Justice Alito would rule on the
right to die.
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we are in all likelihood entering a period of marked uncertainty in the law in this
area as well as many others. As one media outlet succinctly put it when now-Chief
Justice Roberts had been nominated to fill Justice O'Connor's seat: "Swap John
Roberts for Sandra Day O'Connor and what do you get?"'132 What is certain, however, is that much as Justice O'Connor's unfulfilled promises have had a tremendous
impact so too will the views of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Time alone
will tell what that impact will be, but we will all be affected by the direction the
Court takes because one day death will inevitably come for each of us.
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Tom Curry, How John Roberts Could Change Your Life, MSNBC.com, Aug. 8,2005,

http://msnbc.com/id/8826595. Of course, Judge Roberts has now been sworn in as the new
Chief Justice. Roberts Sworn in as ChiefJustice, CNN.com, Sept. 29,2005, http://www.cnn.
com/2005/POLITICS/09/29/roberts.nomination/index.html.

